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Rights and Remedies of Irrigation
District Bondholders
BY DAVID J. MlILER*

I.
NATURE OF IRRIGATION DISTRICT

A,n irrigation district is a public or quasi municipal corporation.'
It is created by order of the board of county commissioners pursuant to
a petition of the landowners setting forth the boundaries of the district
and only after an election has been2 held to determine whether the irrigation district should be organized.
The Colorado statutes provide for three types of irrigation districts.' The first irrigation district act of Colorado was passed in 1901.4
It was amended in 1903,' and was amended and codified in 1905.' It
*Of the Greeley bar.
'Fisher v. Pioneer Construction Co., 62 Colo. 538, 544, 163 Pac. 851 (1917)
30 Am. Jut. Irrigation §78; Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U. S. 112. 17
S. Ct. 56, 41 L. ed. 369 (1896) : Lockhard v. People, 65 Colo. 558. 560. 178 Pac.
565 (1919) ; McCord Merc. Co. v. McIntyre, 25 Colo. App. 376. 379. 138 Pac. 59
(1914); Logan Irrigation Dist. v. Holt, 133 Pac. (2d) 530 (Colo. 1943): Northport Irrigation Dist. v. Henry Wilcox & Son, 131 Fed. (2d) 113 (C.C.A. 8th, 1942)
Holbrook Irrigation Dist. v, First State Bank of Cheraw, 84 Colo. 157. 165, 268 P-c.
523 (1928) : Stephenson v. Pioneer Irrigation Dist., 49 Idaho 189, 288 Pac. 421, 69
A. L. R. 1225 (1930); Tulare Irrigation Dist. v. Shepard, 185 U. S. 1, 22 S. Ct.
531, 46 L. ed. 773 (1902) : Board of Directors of Alfalfa Irrigation Dist. v. Collins,
See Tingwall v. King Hill Irrigation Dist.,
46 Neb. 411. 64 N. W. 1086 (1895).
129 Pac. (2d) 898 (Idaho, 1942) : Note (1922) 17 A. L. R. 81; LONG, IRRIGATION
(2d ed.) §299: Loup River Public Power Dist. v. Middle Loup Public Power and
Irrigation Dist.. 5 N. W. (2d) 249 (Neb., 1942) ; King and Burr, Handbook of the
Irrigation District Laws of the Setenteen Western States of the United States, p. I1 and
cages cited: State ex rel. Clancy v. Columbia Irrigation Dist., 121 Wash. 79, 208 Pac.
27 (1922) : Roberts v. Richland Irrigation Dist, 169 Wash. 156, 13 Pac. (2d) 437
(1932).
-CoLo. STAT. ANN. (1935), ch, 90. §§380. 381.
'COIO. STAT. ANN. (1935), ch. 90, Art. 15 (1), §§377-431: ch. 90, Art. 15
(2). I,$432-471 : ch. 90. Art. 15 (3) §§472-487.
'Coo. l.aws 1q01. page 198.
'Colo. 1.aws 1903, ch. 123.
"Colo. Laws 1905. ch. 113.
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was taken from the Wright Irrigation District Act of California, adopted
in 1887. 7 Because of the many problems arising out of the organization
of irrigation districts under the 1905 act, an irrigation district finance
commission was established. A report was made by the Twenty-third
General Assembly of Colorado (1921) to this commission. The report
lists fifty-six irrigation districts in Colorado of which three were inoperative, eleven dissolved, and twenty-one in operation. Three were in
litigation,otwo were illegally created, and twelve were defunct, and one
was incomplete in organization." The same session of the Colorado
Legislature passed the Irrigation District Act of 1921, designed to remedy some of the difficulties of the 1905 act. This new act provided that
any irrigation district could elect to operate under the act of 1921 by a
two-thirds vote of its landowners.9 Few, if any, districts availed themselves of this opportunity.
In 1928 there were twenty-seven operating irrigation districts in
Colorado covering 537,280 acres of land. Thirteen inactive districts
covered 324,733 acres of land. The 1940 irrigation census shows
twenty-one irrigation districts covering 305,406 acres of land in
Colorado, with a total investment in irrigation works of $15,621,957.
Seven of these districts were $876,273 in arrears on their indebtedness
as of December 3 1, 1939.10 It has been said that a plentiful supply of
bonds seemed more important to the promoters of these districts than a
plentiful supply of water. 1
The last of the three acts providing for irrigation districts is the
Public Irrigation District Act of 1935.12
II.
REMEDIES FOR ENFORCEMENT OF OBLIGATIONS CONTAINED
SOLELY IN STATUTES

Irrigation districts have been a rather fruitful source of litigation
in Colorado and in other western states. The fundamental principles,
upon which rest the rights and liabilities of an irrigation district, is that
a district is a municipal corporation created under state law and possesses
'CAL. STAT. (1887), p. 29; Anderson v. Grand Valley Irrigation Dist., 35 Colo.
525, 85 Pac. 313 (1906).
'Report of the Twenty-third General Assembly to the Colorado Irrigation District
Finance Commission.
9
COLO. STAT. ANN. (1935), ch. 90, §471.
"0lrrigation Districts, Their Organization, Operation, and Financing, U. S. Dept.
of Agr. Technical Bulletin No. 254: 1940 Census Irrigation of Agricultural Lands in
Colorado.

'Ahern v. Highline IrrigationDist.. 39 Colo. 409, 89 Pac. 963 (1907).
'COLO. STAT. ANN. (1935), Cb. 90, §§472-487.
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only those powers vested in it by the legislature." The law under which
a district is created provides at one and the same time the measure of the
rights and liabilities of the bondholder and the landowners, and that
contract cannot be changed on behalf of either the landowner or the
bondholder. 14 Bonds of irrigation districts may be either general obligation bonds or special or limited obligation bonds, according to the law
and the decisions of each state.
In Colorado, bonds of an irrigation district are special obligations
and are enforceable only in accordance with the remedies provided by
law. The Colorado irrigation district law was held constitutional in
Anderson u. Grand Valley IrrigationDistrict.15 The leading case which
forms the basis for the Colorado rule and which has been followed by
our courts in subsequent interpretations and applications of the rule is
Interstate Trust Company u. Montezuma Valley Irrigation District,le
where the court said on page 224:
"The liabilities of the district are a charge upon the land
ratably, with the acre as the unit, on which basis assessments are
determined according to benefits. Back of each dollar of debt stands,
ratably, the irrigable land of the district, the extent of which has
been carefully and exactly ascertained. The law provides the
method whereby warrant holders may take the land itself, at tax
sale, in lieu of warrants if they so desire. This is the letter of their
contract and this is the remedy they must have understood was
provided for them, in the event of failure of payment of the warrants, when they assumed the relationship of creditor to the district.

This manifestly is not repudiation, since the debtor stands ready to
fulfill to the utmost the provisions of the contract according to its
precise terms."
'Yaden v. Gem Irrigation Dist.. 37 Idaho 300, 216 Pac. 250, 252 (1923):
Gordon v. Wheatridge Water Dist., 107 Colo. 128. 109 Pac. (2d) 899 (1941):
Upper Blue Bench Irrigation Dist. v. Continental National Bank and Trust Co., 93
Utah 325, 72 Pac. (2d) 1048 (1937): El Camino Irrigation Dist. v. El Camino
Land Corp., 12 Cal. (2d) 378, 85 Pac. (2d) 123 (1938) : Twohy Brothers v. The
Ochoco Irrigation Dist.. 108 Ore. 1. 210 Pac. 873 (1922) : Bonneville Irrigation Dist.
v. Ririe, 57 Utah 306, 195 Pac. 204 (1920): Note (1936) 105 A. L. R. 1027:
See also
Provident Land Corp v. Zumwalt, 71 Pac. (2d) 825 (Cal. App. 1937).
Swedlund v. Denver Joint Stock Land Bank, 108 Colo. 400, 118 Pac. (2d) 460
(1941). as to drainage district powers; Bottoms v. Madera Irrigation Dist., 74 Cal.
App. 681, 242 Pac. 100. 105 (1925).
'"Straus v. Ketchcn. 54 Idaho 56. 28 Pac. (2d) 824 (1933) : Interstate Trust
Co. v. Montezuma Valley Irrigation Dist., 66 Colo. 219. 181 Pac. 123 (1919):
Peoples State Bank v. Imperial Irrigation Dist., 93 Pac. (2d) 1015 (Cal. App. 1939),
94 Pac. (2d) 370 (Cal. App. 1939). 15 Cal. (2d) 397, 101 Pac. (2d) 466 (1940):
Merchants National Bank v. Escondido Irrigation Dist.. 44 Cal. 329, 77 Pac. 937
(1904): Koch v. Colvin, 110 Mont. 594. 105 Pac. (2d) 334 (1940): Mulcahy v.
Baldwin. 216 Cal. 517. 15 Pac. (2d) 738 (1932): Hershey v. Cole. 131 Cal. 211.
20 Pac, (2d) 972 (1933).
'35 Colo. 525. 85 Pac. 313 (1906).
'"66 Colo. 219. 181 Pac. 123 (1'919).
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In Colorado each acre of land is liable only for its proportionate
part of district indebtedness. There can be no cumulative levies. 1 7 Other
western states, notably California, Washington, Idaho, Nevada, and
Oregon,"' do not follow the same rule but have held irrigation district
bonds to be general obligations of the district. Montana and Utah,
along with Colorado, hold the bonds to be limited obligation bonds. 19
The primary and only source for the payment of warrants issued
by an irrigation district is annual assessments. 20 The Supreme Court of
California has held that an irrigation district bondholder was not entitled to reach funds from contracts by the irrigation district with power
21
companies for the sale of electrical energy.
It has been repeatedly held that the provisions of the irrigation
district act for the enforcement of district obligations are exclusive and
that no additional remedies will be implied which are not provided speci-

fically by the law. This follows from the original premise that an irrigation district is a special assessment or local improvement district and a
public corporation created by the legislature for special purposes and
with special powers only. These powers are strictly limited under the
familiar rule of grants of power to municipal or special or public corporations. 2 -2 Colorado follows the rule of construing strictly statutes im24
posing special taxes. 2 3 Thus in Gordon v. Wheatridge Water District
the court stated:
"Where the legislature fixes the method by which the bonds
are to be paid, that method not only must be followed, but the
"Interstate Trust Co. v. Montezuma Valley Irrigation

Dist., supra note 14:

Thomas v. Henrylyn Irrigation Dist., 79 Colo. 636, 640, 247 Pac. 1059 (1926) ;
Rio Grande Junction Railway Co. v. Orchard Mesa Irrigation Dist., 64 Colo. 334.
171 Pac. 367 (1918); Henrylyn Irrigation Dist. v. Thomas, 64 Colo. 413, 173
Pac. 541 (1918): Board of County Commissioners v. Heath, 87 Colo. 204, 286
Pac. 107 (1930) Wilcox ZI Son v. Riverview Drainage Dist., 93 Colo. 115, 25 Pac.
(2d) 172 (1933); Denver-Greeley Valley Irrigation Dist. v. McNeil, 80 Fed. (2d)
929 (C. C. A. 10th, 1936) : Divide Creek Irrigation Dist. v. Hollingsworth, 72 Fed.
(2d) 859, 92 A. L. R. 937 (C. C. A. 10th, 1934); Denver-Greeley Valley.Irrigation Dist. v. McNeil, 106 Fed. (2d) 288 (C. C. A. 10th, 1939).
"SAmerican Falls Reservoir Dist. v. Thrall. 39 Idaho 105. 130, 228 Pac. 236
(1924): In re Lovelock Irrigation Dist.. 51 Nev. 215. 273 Pac. 983 (1929): Noble
v. Yancey, 116 Ore. 356, 241 Pac. 335. 42 A. 1L.R. 1178 (1925) : State ex rel.
Clancey v. Columbia Irrigation Dist.. supra note 1 : State v. Hartung, 150 Wash. 590.
274 Pac. 181 (1929) ; Roberts v. Richland Irrigation Dist., supra note 1, affd. Roberts
v. Richland Irrigation Dist., 289 U. S. 71, 53 S. Ct. 519, 77 L. ed. 1038 (1933).
" State ex rel. Malott v. Board of Commissioners. 89 Mont. 37, 95, 296 Pac. 1.
18 (1931); Nelsonv. Davis County. 62 Utah 218. 218 Pac. 952 (1923).
'Redmond Realty Co. v. Central Oregon Irrigation Dist.. 140 Ore. 282, 12 Pac.
(2d) 1097, 1099 (1932); Kollock v. Barnard. 116 Ore. 694. 242 Pac. 847 (1926).
'Mulcahy v. Baldwin, 216 Cal. 517, 15 P. (2d) 738 (1932).
"'Yaden v. Gem Irrigation Dist.. 37 Idaho 300, 216 Pac. 250 (1923).
'-People v. Koenig, 37 Colo. 283, 85 Pac. 1129 (1906): Ahern v. High Line
Irrigation Dist., 39 Colo. 409, 89 Pac. 963 (1907) ; Gordon v. Wheatridge Water
Dist.. 107 Colo. 128, 109 P. (2d) 899 (1941).
2-Supra

note 23 at p. 139.
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bondholder's remedy is so restricted as to require- him to seek paythe statute."
ment of his bonds out of the revenues provided by
This rule has been applied by federal as well as state courts. In
Gas Securities Co. v. Nile IrrigationDistrict,25 it was held:
"The bonds are of purely statutory origin and can look to
no other sources of, nor security for, payment than those provided
in the statute. The statute is definite and specific upon these matters. It follows that no lien extending such rights to other funds
can be recognized. Since this judgment and its proceeds fall within
the statutory provisions for payment or security of these bonds, no
lien can be attached thereto in favor of the bonds."
In Johnson v.RiL'erland Levee District,2 ' the same rule was applied.
27
the Oregon
Coughanour,
In Payette-OregonSlope IrrigationDistrict v,.
held:
Court
Supreme
"The plaintiff irrigation district, a quasi-municipal corporation, is a creature of the statute and possesses only those powers
expressly or impliedly granted it by the legislature. It is also fundamental that the powers thus granted must be exercised in substantial compliance with the mode specified in the statute. The
legislature having prescribed the method and manner of levying
assessments, it follows that itmust not be exercised in any other
manner.
III.
RIGHT TO HAVE PROPER LEVY
There is one right given to district creditors in all western states.
Proper levies must be made upon lands in the, district. 28 The rule is
'293 Fed. 365 (C. C. A. 8th, 1923).
:117 F. (2d) 711,.113 A. L. R. 326 (C. C. A. 8th. 1941). See also Twohy
Brothers v. Ochoco Irrigation Dist., supra note 13: Duncan v. St. John Levee and
Drainage Dist., 69 F. (2d) 342 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934) ;Street Grading Dist. v. Hagadorn, 186 Fed. 451, 456 (C. C. A. 8th, 1931); Rees v.Watertown, 19 Wall. 107.
22 L. ed. 72 (1873); Heine v. Levee Commissioners, 19 Wall. 655. 22 L. ed. 223
(1873).
r91 P. (2d) 526, 527 (Ore. 1939).
'Denver-Greeley Valley Irrigation Dist. v. McNeil, 106 F. (2d) 288 (C. C. A.
10th, 1939); Board of County Commissioners v. Heath. supra note 17: Henrylyn
Irrigation Dist. v. Howard, 68 Colo. 236, 187 Pac. 653 (1920) : Henrylyn Irrigation
Dist. v. Thomas. 66 Colo. 296. 181 Pac. 979. 66 Colo. 300, 181 Pac. 980 (1919):
Kerber Creek Irrigation Dist. v. Woodard, 76 Colo. 219, 230 Pac. 807 (1924): Rio
Grande Junction Railway v. Orchard Mesa Irrigation Dist., supra note 17: Thomas v.
Henrylyn Irrigation Dist.. supra note 17: Clough v. Baber. 38 Cal. App. (2d) 50.
100 Pac. (2d) 519 (1940) : State v. Melville, 149 Ore. 532, 41 Pac. (2d) 1071
(1935): Kollock v. Barnard, supra note 20. See cases collected 58 A. L. R. 117
citing cases from twenty-six srates. Minority cases are those from New Hampshire and
Virginia only: 38 C. J. Mandamus p. 776, §424; Johnson v. Riverland Levee Dist..
117 F. (2d) 711 (C. C. A. 8th. 1941).
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universal that the right of mandamus lies for failure of the proper
authorities to make a levy for the payment of district indebtedness.
But even the right of mandamus is not unlimited. California follows the rule of cumulative levies, provided action is brought within the
proper time. However, the California Court of Appeals, in El Camino
Land Corporationv. Board of Supervisors of Tehama County, 29 held
that a writ of mandamus would not always be issued, stating:
- 'The issuance of the writ is not altogether a matter of right.
but involves consideration of its effect in promoting justice. The
granting or refusing of the writ lies, therefore, to a considerable
extent, within the sound discretion of the court where the application is made. Cases may, therefore, arise where the applicant for
relief has an undoubted right, for which mandamus is the appropriate remedy but where the court may, in the exercise of a wise discretion, still refuse the relief.' 16 Cal. Jur. p. 768, sec. 7."
In that case the court refused a writ of mandamus which would
result in a burden of $128.26 per acre against land in the district, twenty-five per cent of which was worth $25 an acre, ten per cent of which
was worth $60 an acre, and sixty-five per cent of which was worth $20
an acre. The court found that the levy
"*

*

* would yield no funds for the payment of the bond

interest and bond principal but would throw the affairs of said
district into a more complicated state of chaos and confusion and
would be fatal to the landowners in said district, and said landowners owning lands would lose title thereto for nonpayment of
assessments without benefit to the bondholders or holders of matured interest coupons."
Other courts have announced the same principle. 3°

IV.
MONEY JUDGMENT CANNOT BE ENTERED AGAINST DISTRICT

No judgment can be entered against an irrigation district based
upon bonds, coupons and warrants of the district. In the case of Henrylyn IrrigationDistrict u. Thomas,3 t the Colorado Supreme Court held
that no money judgment will be entered against an irrigation district
upon bonds or coupons. The same rule has been followed in Cali3

for.nia. 2
"43 Cal. App. (2d) 351, 110 P. (2d) 1076, 1078 (1941).
3
Snower v. Hope Drainage Dist., 2 F. Supp. 931 (W. D. Mo. 1933) ; Farrow
v. Eldred Drainage and Levee Dist., 359 Ill. 347, 194 N. E. 515 (1935).
64 Colo. 334, 171 Pac. 367 (1918).
'Colo.: Rio Grande Junction Railway Co. v. Orchard Mesa Irrigation Dist.,
supra note 17. Calif.: Moody v. Provident Irrigation Dist., 12 Cal. (2d) 389, 85
Pac. (2d) 128 (1938)
Carpenter v. Glenn-Colusa Irrigation Dist., 14 Cal. (2d)
338, 87 Pac. (2d) 61 (1939).
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In the case of an unliquidated claim in which no liability is admitted and the amount of indebtedness is undetermined, a suit will lie
and a judgment may be entered .13 An anomoly is presented by various
cases in the federal court for this district in which judgments were entered. 34 The rule in the United States district court for the district of
Colorado has been to enter a judgment in any case in which bonds, coupons, or warrants of a district were unpaid and suit was brought upon
them. This is also true of the Moffat Tunnel Improvement District and
other special assessment or local improvement districts in this jurisdiction. The federal court has followed the practice of entering judgment
because under the old federal court rules mandamus was an ancillary
remedy only,- therefore a judgment was entered as a matter of course
so that a writ of mandamus could thereafter be issued. The judgments
invariably provided that they would be enforceable only according to the
laws of the state of Colorado. However, a judgment once. having been
entered, the holders of the judgment would attempt by various methods
to secure collection thereof as though the judgments were unlimited.
Under the new federal rule, writs of mandamus were abolished.
Rule 81 (b) providing as follows:
"SCIRE FACIAS AND MANDAMUS. The writs of scire
facias and mandamus are abolished. Relief heretofore available by
mandamus or scire facias may be obtained by appropriate action or
by appropriate motion under the practice prescribed in these rules."
Unquestionably, no further judgments should be entered even in
the United States courts pursuant to the new rule.
V.
WRITS OF EXECUTION OR GARNISHMENT Do NOT LIE
AGAINST DISTRICT

No execution, levy, or garnishment can be made against an irrigation district or the property thereof. No rule appears to be better established than that there can be no execution issued against an irrigation
district or special improvement district. This point has not been specifically ruled on by the Colorado Supreme Court. However, a judgment
.North Sterling Irrigation Dist. v. Dickman, 59 Colo. 169. 149 Pac. 97 (1915):
Tulare Irrigation Dist. v. Collins. 154 Cal. 440. 97 Pac. 1124 (1908) ; Cocoa Rockledge Drainage Dist. v. Garrett, 140 Fla. 359, 191 So. 687 (1939).
"Denver-Greeley Valley Irrigation Dist. v. McNeil, 80 F. (2d) 929 (C. C. A.
10th, 1936). 106 F, (2d) 288 (C. A. A. 10th, 1939).
'In Denver-Greeley Valley Irrigation Dist. v. McNeil, 106 F. (2d) 288. 292 (C.
C. A. 10th, 1939), the court held: "The remedy of mandamus in the United States
.courts is ancillary. The writ is issuable only after the right has ripened into judgment."
In Rialto Irrigation Dist. v. Stowell, 246 Fed. 294 (C. C. A. 9th. 1917) a judgment
on California irrigation district bonds was permitted. This case appears superseded by
later California cases.
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has been specifically refused. Since judgment cannot be entered, it follows
that there can be no proceedings supplementary to or in aid of judgment.
The Colorado Supreme Court, in Alpha Corporation v. Denver3 6
Greeley Valley Irrigation District,
affirmed the findings of fact, conclusions of law and decree of dissolution of The Denver-Greeley Valley
Irrigation District, in which the Weld County district court had held
as a conclusion of law that there could be no execution against the irrigation district. No specific reference to that portion of the decree of the
district court was made by the Colorado Supreme Court, but the decree
was affirmed.
In State v. Blake37 it was held that a judgment creditor could not
seize on execution, district property.38 The rule against execution was
followed, even though execution was sought against land not used for
irrigation purposes and not strictly a part of the irrigation system.3,
Execution has also been denied in many other states."0
The federal courts have applied the same rule. 4 1

And in Gue

v,. Tide Water Canal Company,42 Chief Justice Taney of the United
States Supreme Court sustained an injunction against a sheriff to restrain
the sale of property of the Tide Water Canal Company, which operated
43
a toll canal.
The denial of a writ of execution appears to rest upon two grounds,
first that an execution cannot be used to hamper the affairs of a public
'132 P. (2d) 448 (Colo. 1942).
788 Utah 584, 20 P. (2d) 871 (1933).
'The Blake case was followed in Utah Oil Refining Co. v. Millard County Drainage Dist., 90 Utah 67, 50 Pac. (2d) 774 (1935) ; and Upper Blue Bench Irrigation
Dist. v. Continental National Bank and Trust Co., supra note 13.
: Upper Blue Bench Irrigation Dist. v. Continental National Bank and Trust Co.,
.supranote 13.

"Calif.:

Tulare Irrigation Dist. v. Collins, supra note 33: San Francisco Savings

Union v. Reclamation Dist., 144 Cal. 639, 79 Pac. 374 (1904) ; El Camino Irrigation Dist. v. El Camino Land Corp., supra note 13. Idaho: Sudler, Wegener and Co.

v. Hillsdale Irrigation Dist., 123 Pac. (2d) 420 (1942).

Because of similarity, drain-

age cases are also in point. See Farrow v. Eldred Drainage and Levee Dist., supra note
30: Snower v. Hope Drainage Dist., supra note 30.
In Eldredge v. Mill Ditch Co.,
90 Ore. 590, 177 Pac. 939 (1919), execution against a public water company was
denied. No execution is permitted against school districts.
See Brooks v. One Motor
Bus, 190 S. C. 379. 3 S. E. (2d) 42 (1939): Waterman-Waterbury Co. v. School
District No. 4. 183 Mich. 168: 150 N. V. 104 (1914). Garnishment was permitted
by statute in State Bank of Florence v. School District, 289 N. W. 612 (Wis. 1940).
In Eastern Union Co. v. Moffat Tunnel Improvement Dist., 6 W. W. Howe 488, 178
Atd. 864 (Del. Super. 1935). garnishment of district funds was refused.
"Snower v. Hope Drainage Dist., 2 F. Supp. 931 (W. D. Mo. 1933).
1224 How. 257, 16 L..ed. 635 (1861).
'In Denver-Greeley Valley Irrigation Dist. v. McNeil, 106 Fed. (2d) 288 (C. C.
A. 10th. 1939), and Denver-Greeley Valley Water Users Assn. v. McNeil, 131 F. (2d)
67, 72 (C. C. A. 10th, 1939), the court held that the usual orocess was not available.
Mandamus is available where no other remedy is available, People ex rel. Griffith v.
Bundy, 107 Colo. 102, 111, 109 Pac. (2d) 261 (1941).
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that mandamus is in reality a substitute for the
corporation; secondly,
4 "
writ of execution.
In Sudler, Wegener &5Co. u. Hillsdale Irrigation District,"4 the
district court ordered an execution against the irrigation district. The
Supreme Court in reversing the decision held:
"In an action of this nature, the property of public corporations and quasi-public corporations is not subject to execution.
This exemption rests on considerations of public policy. Appellant
Hillsdale Irrigation District being a quasi-public corporation, the
judgment of the trial court, insofar as it orders that the plaintiff
have execution against the district, must be reversed."
VI.

No MECHANIC'S LIEN CAN BE PLACED AGAINST PROPERTY
OF DISTRICT

No mechanic's lien can be placed upon the property of an irrigation district. In Fisher u. Pitneer Construction Company, 46 it was
stated:
"That the property of a public corporation acquired and used
for public purposes, is not subject to a mechanic's lien, we take it
cannot be seriously questioned.-25 Cyc. 25; Florman v. School
District, 6 Colo. App. 319, 40 Pac. 469; Thomas v. Urbana
School Dist., 71 Ill. 283; San Francisco Sat. Union v. Reclamation Dist., supra; Whiteside v. School Dist., 20 Mont. 44, 49 Pac.
445; PortlandL. & M. Co. v. &choolDist., 13 Ore. 283. 10 Pac.
350; Nat[. Fire P. Co. u. Huntington, 81 Conn. 632, 71 Ad.
911, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 261; Hovey t. East Providence, 17 R. I.
Water
80, 20 Atl. 205, 9 L. R. A. 156; Guest v. Lower Merion
7
Co., 142 Pa. 610, 21 Atl. 1001, 12 L. R. A. 324."
VII.
THE RIGHT TO APPOINTMENT OF RECEIVER

It has been held that no receiver will be appointed for an irrigation
or public improvement district. Apparently the only case in which the
appointment of a receiver, court commissioner, or special master was
indicated is Beck v. Otero Irrigation District.4 8 Two decisions in the
Beck case were reported, but both were memorandum decisions only.
"City of Harper v. Daniels, 211 Fed. 57, 63 (C. C. A. 8th, 1914).
'5123 P. (2d) 420, 422 (Idaho, 1942).
662 Colo. 538, 544, 163 Pac. 851 (1917).
'See also Note (1923) 26 A. L. R. 326.
1S38 F. (2d) 275 (D. Colo. 1929); 50 F. (2d) 951 (D. Colo. 1931).
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Neither were final adjudications of the rights of the parties. In the
second reported decision in the case,4 9 Judge Kennedy stated that a
receiver would be appointed unless arrangements were made for the payment of district creditors. No receiver was actually appointed. However,
a special master was appointed to take testimony and make recommendations to the court as to what disposition should be made. No report
was ever made by the special master, and a composition with creditors
was reached under the Municipal Bankruptcy Act.
As against the dictum of the Beck case, we have the considered
judgments of other courts, both state and federal, that a receiver will not
be appointed except in those cases where the state law specifically provides for such an appointment.'1 One of the leading cases on the subject
is Yost L,.Dallas County.3 In that case a writ of mandamus had been
issued for a levy to pay bonds issued by a county in Missouri under a
Missouri law providing for the issuance of railroad bonds. The orders
were evaded and the plaintiff sought the appointment of a commissioner
to levy, collect and pay over taxes into court for the account of the district creditors. The Supreme Court of the U.nited States held that the
state law and not the United States Constitution determined the obligation of the contract as evidence of which the bonds were issued, that
the taxing power could be exercised only as provided by state law, and
that no court commissioner could be appointed. In Meriwether t. Garrett, ,2 an attempt was made to have the court authorize taxes for the
payment of creditors of a dissolved municipal corporation. The court
held that there was no machinery provided for the levying and collecting
of taxes which it could set in motion. In the case of Cocoa Rockledge
Drainage District v.Garrett,5 thd1creditors petitioned for the appointment of a receiver to collect, levy, and pay over taxes because the Board
of County Supervisors had failed to act. Mandamus had previously been
issued by the state court. The state law provided for the appointment
of a receiver upon default in payment of bonds. However, the instant
claim was based upon attorney's fees and a judgment had been entered
pursuant to a denial of the claim by the district. The court held that the
remedy provided by law for the appointment of a receiver for default in
payment of bonds could not be extended to apply to a judgment. The
court refused the appointment of the receiver upon the authority of Yost
c. Dallas-- and other cases. In Street Grading District No. 60 V.Haga'50 F. (2d)

951 (D. Colo. 1931).

"'See Methods of Enforcing Satisfaction of Obligations of Public Corporations, 33

COL. L. REV. 28; Note (1938) 113 A. L. R. 755; JONES, BONDS AND BONDHOLDIRS §489.
'1236 U. S. 50, 35 S. Ct. 235, 59 L. ed. 460 (1915).
-102 U.S. 472, 26 L. ed. 197 (1880).
"140 Fla. 359, 191 So. 689 (1939).
:"Supra note 51.
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dorn,5 supra, a petition for the appointment of a receiver was denied.
There the court stated that the remedy sought was not available because
the law provides the means for the raising of money by taxes and
"This mode of collecting taxes for the payment of complainants' bonds constituted a part of the contract under and subject to
which they were purchased. The enforcement of this provision,
namely, enforcement of collection in the mode and through the
officers named in the law, is all complainants are entitled to under
their contract, and, accordingly, is the only remedy known to the
law in case of nonpayment of the bonds."
,
In State ex rel. Lynch v. District Court,- cases on the point that no
receiver will be appointed unless the statute specifically so provides are
reviewed and analyzed. ,7 In Johnson v. Riterland Levee District,""the
bondholders sought a judgment and accounting, the establishment of a
lien, and a special judgment against the lands in the district, a mandatory
injunction for the making of levies, the appointment of a receiver, the
setting aside of fraudulent conveyances, the return of bonds, the dissolution of a holding company, and a restoration of district assest. The
court dismissed the petition. The law under which the bonds were
provided mandamus for a breach of duty. This was only a
issued
statutory statement of the rule that existed prior to the passage of the
act. The court stated:

"That the Federal court has no power to collect taxes has been
so frequently decided that it is no longer debatable. The remedy
provided by statute for the payment of bonds issued under authority of a law of a state is exclusive. Scott u. Neely, 140 U. S. 106,
11 S. Ct. 712, 35 L. ed. 358; Heine v. Board of Levee Commissioners, 19 Wall. 655, 86 U. S. 655, 22 L. ed. 223; Yost v.Dallas
County. supra; Rees v. Vatertown, 19 Wall. 107. 86 U. S. 107.
22 L. ed. 72; Thompson v. Allen County, 115 U. S. 550, 6 S.
Ct. 140, 29 L. ed. 472; Louisville Trust Co. v. Muhlenberg Co..
23 S. W. 674, 15 Ky. Law Rep. 397; City of Clinton to use of
Thorton v.Henry County, 115 Mo. 557, 569. 22 S. W. 494, 37
Am. St. Rep. 415; McGinis v.Missouri Car and Foundry Co.. 174
"'186 Fed. 451, 456 (C. C. A. 8th, 1911).
-"41 N. M. 658, 73 P. (2d) 333, 113 A. L. R. 746 (1937).
5'See also Marra v. San Jacinto Irrigation Dist., 131 Fed. 780 (S. D. Cal. 1904)
Depew v. Venice Drainage Dist., 158 La. 1099, 105 So. 78 (1925); Preston v.
Sturgis Milling Co.. 183 Fed. 1. 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1020 (C. C. A..6th, 1910):
Barkley v. Levee Corn.. 93 U. S. 258, 23 L. ed. 893 (1876); O'Brien v. Wheelock.
78 Fed. 673 (S.D. I1. 1897).
ll7 F. (2d) 711 (C. C. A. 8th, 1941).
OMo. REV. STAT. (1929) §§]10902-10957; MO. STAT. ANN. §§10902-10957.

pp. 3592-3633.
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Mo. 225, 232, 73 S. W. 586, 97 Am. St. Rep. 553; Bushnell v.
Mississippi and Fox River Drainage Dist., 233 Mo. App. 921, 111
S. W. (2d)
946, 952; Kansas City v. Field, 285 Mo. 253, 226
''
S. W. 27.

60

VIII.
RIGHT TO EQUITABLE RELIEF

There have been various attempts to secure equitable relief for irrigation district creditors. Districts frequently acquire land for non-payment of irrigation district taxes. In Clough v. Compton-Delevan Irrigation Districtol district creditors sought partition of district acquired
lands. The court held:
"There is, first, no lien nor resulting trust arising from the
purchase of the bonds. The statute fully defines the relationship of
bondholders, district and landowners. Nowhere does it declare that
the bondholder has a lien on the land itself, and it certainly does
not recognize any trust for his sole benefit. Section 29 provides
that the title to land acquired by the district shall vest in the district, 'and shall be held by such district, in trust for, and is hereby
dedicated and set apart to the uses and purposes set forth in this
act.'

''02

No partition was decreed.
Courts of equity may intervene to preserve the proceeds of levy for
the persons entitled thereto.
An example of the intervention by court of equity to prevent dissipation of funds of an irrigation district provided for payment of bonds
and coupons is that of Provident Land Corporation u. Zumwalt.6 3 In
that case The Provident Irrigation District purchased future due bonds
of the district with money coming into its hands from the rental of land
acquired for non-payment of taxes. The, court ordered the funds returned and distributed to all past due bond holders. However, the court
permitted deductions from the fund for proper district expenses, and
presumably for acquisition of tax title and of maintenance and operation
during the period that the land was owned and leased by the district to
tenants. The court held:
'Cases holding that the federal courts will not levy and collect taxes of public
corporations include Rorick v. U. S. Sugar Corp., 120 F. (2d) 418 (C. C. A. 5th,
1941). It is to be noted that this case also holds that though the Florida drainage act
gave the right of foreclosure for failure to pay taxes, the court held such right could not
be enforced by a suit'in equity for foreclosure by a bondholder but mandamus against
the public officer must be instituted.
'12 Cal. (2d) 385. 85 P. (2d) 126 (1938).
-85 P. (2d) at 128.
12 Cal. (2d) 389. 85 P. (2d) 116 (1938).
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"We assume, for the purposes of this case, that the directors,
in their discretion, may determine that some of the proceeds of leasing of lands are essential to operation and maintenance, and may
use them for these purposes. But any surplus, over and above operating expenses, remains 4subject to the trust, and should go to payment of bondholders." 6
While the California courts regard irrigation district bonds as general obligations and while in this case the court states specifically that
the land cannot be released from the lien of the bond until payment in
full has been made, nevertheless, the same protection should be given
and accorded to bondholders and other irrigation creditors in thog
states in which irrigation district bonds are held to be special obligation
bonds and not general obligation bonds.
In Cooper v. Gibson' it was held that a court may compel the
distribution of funds in the hands of a drainage district treasurer to those
persons who are properly entitled to them.
The rule of Prouident Land Corporation v. Zumwalthu cannot be
extended to hold that an irrigation district may not dispose of property
held by it. In Johnson v. Warm Springs Irrigation District-7 the district brought a statutory proceeding to sell water which it contended was
surplus water. After sale bondholders appeared and attempted to enjoin
the completion of the sale. The statute authorizing the sale was passed
after the issuance of the bonds. However, the court sustained the sale of
the water and held that the act did not violate or impair any rights of
contract. This case demonstrates that an irrigation district creditor does
not have a special lien upon all district property even in a state in which
the theory of general obligation bonds is followed.
Ix.
REMEDY OF BONDHOLDERS PROTECTIVE COMMITTEE

Under the decision in Interstate Trust Company v. Montezuma
Valley IrrigationDistrict,68 any irrigation district bondholder or coupon
holder may appear at tax sale and offer his bonds and coupons in purchase of tax sale certificates upon district land being sold for nonpayment of taxes levied for payment of bonds or coupons. In Colorado,
even after sale, by tendering the coupons and bonds as so much cash, an
0'85 P. (2d) at 121.
'133 Cal. App. 532, 24 P. (2d) 952 (1933).
'Supra note 63.
"118 Ore. 239, 246 Pac. 527 (1926).
'66 Colo. 219, 181 Pac. 123 (1919).
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irrigation district coupon holder or bondholder may acquire a tax sale
certificate and convert his bond into a lien upon a particular piece of
property. It appears to be true that the same procedure could be used in
other states. As a practical matter, this method of handling tax certificates has not been followed to any great extent.
The original irrigation district act of Colorado provided that bonds
and coupons could be used as cash in payment of district taxes levied for
the payment of those bonds or coupons,"9 The theory for including this
provision in the act was to provide a ready market for coupons and
bonds of the district. However, since most of the irrigation district promotions were overly optimistic and a very large portion of land immediately failed to pay taxes, this market for bonds was practically nonexistent. Competition for farmer buyers of defaulted bonds drove down
the price for bonds. In most cases in Colorado irrigation district creditors
organized bondholders protective committees and made a blanket sale of
bonds and coupons to farmers in irrigation districts at a substantial
discount.
To some extent the organization of these bondholders protective
committees served to solve the problem of the individual bondholder
being unable to use his bond and coupons. The committee is in better
position to sell to individual land owners in the district or to acquire
tax certificates and consequently tax deeds. It can retain services of counsel and prevent natural competition of bondholders for a market.
X.
REMEDY BY WAY OF TAX SALE

The method provided for taxation by the district under the irrigation district statutes of western states uniformly provides for the sale
of land for nonpayment of irrigation district taxes. This sale is generally conducted by the county treasurer in substantially the same manner as a sale for general taxes. The statutes of Colorado and other states
provide that the land shall be stricken off to the district if there are no
other bidders. Hence, the district acquires a good many tax sale certificates for both maintenance and operation, and bond and bond interest
taxes. The law in Colorado provides that the district may acquire title
to land by a tax deed.
"'Colo. Laws 1901, ch. 87, §19; Colo. Laws 1905, ch. 113, §20; COLO. STAT.
ANN. (1935), ch. 90, §398. The Irrigation District Act of 1921 contains the same
provision, COLO. STAT. ANN. (1935), ch. 90, §459. The Public Irrigation District
Act of 1935 does not provide for payment of taxes to the County Treasurer nor does
it provide for use of bonds and coupons.
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In Noble u.Provident Irrigation District7 " bondholders of the district filed a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the irrigation
district to acquire tax deeds upon the lands in the district. The petition
was denied because of insufficient allegations of fact. The case was remanded to the trial court. Inquiry of counsel for the district reveals that
no further action was taken by filing an amended petition or by proceedings in any additional case for that purpose.
XI.
SUMMARY

In summarizing the rights and remedies of bondholders of irrigation districts we find:
I. No judgment may be entered against an irrigation district
except upon unliquidated claims.
2. No execution, garnishment or supplementary process may be
issued against an irrigation district.
3.

There can be no mechanic's lien upon irrigation district prop-

4.

Courts have not appointed receivers for irrigation districts.

erty.
5. Irrigation district creditors are entitled to the protection of a
court of equity to prevent dissipation by the district or its officers of any
of the assets of the district properly within the fund provided by law for
the payment of district obligations.
6. A writ of mandamus will lie against any district official or any
county official who fails to perform his duty in making a proper levy
upon lands legally within the district and enforcing the collection thereof
by tax sales.
7.

Partition of district lands will not be decreed.

8.

No district has been forced to acquire lands by tax deed.

9. A ratable distribution of the fund set aside for district creditors
will be ordered.

'°10 Cal. App. (2d)

384. 51 P. (2d)

896 (1935).
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The Lawyer in Wartime*
BY FRANCIS BIDDLEt

It is too early in the struggle to appraise the contribution of American lawyers to the effective prosecution of the war. We may be confident,
however, that when the appraisal is made the result will do honor to the
profession. A substantial segment of the bar is already serving in the
armed forces; the Army alcne has well over 15,000 lawyers, a high
proportion of them commissioned officers. Civilian agencies engaged in
war work or in less dramatic but none the less essential supporting activities have drawn heavily on the bar to provide new personnel as well as
to replace younger men as they are called to the colors. More than 4,000
attorneys, drawn for the most part from the active bar, have thus entered
the Civil Service since the emergency began. Many more, without surrendering private practice, have responded to the repeated calls for personnel to staff the numerous boards performing such wartime functions
as the administration of the Selective Service Act, the control of enemy
aliens, the maintenance of harmonious labor relations, price control,
rationing, local defense councils and the multifarious activities of relief
organizations. The War Committee of the American Bar Association
has already accomplished much in mobilizing the talent and energies of
the organized bar behind the war program. And in every community
lawyers, whatever else they may already be doing, are called upon to
help explain the many government regulations which have become a
painful necessity in wartime America.
Despite the great and growing contribution of the bar as a whole,
it is, of course, true that many lawyers have not yet found a satisfactory
mode of service. Taken by itself, the practice of law seems far away
from the war. In many areas there has been a marked decline in the
volume of ordinary peacetime legal work without compensating activity
incident to the war. Where that has been so, lawyers have understandably been seized with a sense of futility. Sharing the universal desire to
be of service, they ask what the lawyer can do if he is unable to enter the
armed forces or to participate in the civilian government. Must a lawyer
*Reprinted by permission from THE SHINGLE for May, 1943.
?Attorney General of the United States.
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surrender his practice and his place in his home community in order to
be of genuine service? The answer is that the lawyer has an important
role to play in his own community-for which he is fitted by training,
experience and professional tradition. The lawyer's capacity for appraising evidence and defining issues, his understanding of American values
and his sense of historical perspective can be of consta.nt service in the
most important enterprise on the home front-the clarification and leadership of American opinion.
The people of America today, perhaps more than ever in their national history, are receiving a constant stream of news, speeches, books,
pamphlets and reports which have a direct influence upon their daily
lives. Momentous issues in the post-war world are now in the making
and it is necessary for the people to think clearly on these issues. The
strongest and most intelligent leadership cannot function without a responsive and thoughtful country back of it. The lawyer must, of course,
express his own opinions and work for the particular type of post-war
world in which he believes. There is a broader function, however, which
he can perform. This is the function of clarifying the issues, of separating the important facts from the immaterial facts, of isolating the fundamental problems from the small accidental questions, so that these great
issues can be decided through the democratic processes by an informed
and clear-thinking nation.
Part of every lawyer's equipment is a history of American constitutional law. It is a body of knowledge which stands the lawyer in good
stead in time of war. When it is said, for instance, that the delegation of
broad war powers to the President by Congress is subversive of our
democracy and unjustified by our constitutional history, the lawyer will
know that this is untrue. He knows that every major war in which the
United States has taken part has necessitated broad presidential discretion in war matters and that Congress has invariably given the President
this discretion. He knows that it is as impossible to provide by statute
specific solutions for each domestic wartime problem as it is to issue orders to a commanding general in the field, telling him what to do under
every possible circumstance of battle. It is the lawyer's duty to explain
this historical American tradition to the members of his community, to
make clear that it is our democracy's historic method of preserving itself
during time of peril.
Perhaps the most important lesson which the lawyer's know-ledge
of our constitutional history has taught him is the need for constant and
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vigilant safeguarding of civil liberties during time of war. He knows
that in times of greatest peril we have always preserved a wide range of
popular criticism; that, indeed, the wartime strength of democracy depends upon a constant flow of new ideas to the Government from the
people. He knows that in every war many persons become so overzealous in their attempts to stamp out enemy-inspired propaganda and
defeatist doctrines that they attempt to silence all criticism of the war,
no matter how patriotic and responsible it may be. It is the lawyer's
duty to be on the alert for these excesses of patriotic fervor and to do all
in his power to preserve the right of all loyal citizens freely to offer their
ideas and comments on the conduct of the war.
A striking example of the misunderstanding and intolerance which
can arise during war came to my attention when the Judge Advocate
General of the United States and I were prosecuting the eight Nazi saboteurs before a military commission during the summer of 1942. Two
Army officers, both distinguished lawyers, had been ordered by the President to defend the saboteurs. Putting aside any personal feelings they
may have had in the matter, these men and their assistants conducted a
most able defense. During the course of the trial I received several indignant letters which accused counsel for the saboteurs of all manner of
traitorous and treasonable conduct. I also heard people say that the
saboteurs should be taken out and shot instantly with no hearing.
It is the lawyer's duty to explain to people with such views our
American tradition of offering every man, whether before a civil or a
military tribunal, an opportunity to prove his innocence. The lawyer
knows how easy it is for powerful emotions to overcome a reasoned sense
of justice, and he knows that in such cases it is particularly important to
insist on a fair and thorough hearing. No nation ever benefits by the
conviction of innocent men. The surest way to prevent this is to provide
the accused person with counsel whose duty it is to make as strong a
defense as possible. The Army officers who defended the saboteurs were
performing a function which is essential if our basic concepts of due
process and fairness in judicial proceedings are to be preserved. The lawyer knows this from his study of American and English legal history.
It is his duty to use that knowledge to combat any form of intolerance
and short-sighted patriotic zeal.
In time of war the lawyer has important duties as one of the intellectual leaders of his community. He must help sustain the morale of
the people under the burdens of war; he must help them to avoid the
fears and doubts which are bred by false rumors; and he must keep ever
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before them our American traditions of democracy and liberty. Thus
may be continued the historic function of the American lawyer in time
of crisis. In the very beginning of our national history, lawyers made up
the Revolutionary Committees of Correspondence which played so large
a part in crystallizing the united will of the American people. Many
lawyers took part in the actual conduct of the Revolutionary War: when
it had been won, lawyers were responsible for embodying the democratic
ideals of the people in the Constitution. As Justice Stone has said:
'They not only kindled the flame of the Revolution but they
translated the Revolution into institutions under the forms of law
with a passionate devotion to liberty and a skill and statesmanlike
grasp which has excited the wonder and admiration of the historian.
Perhaps the finest tribute ever paid the American bar is that contained in Edmund Burke's speech, "Conciliation with America." In
explaining the extraordinary advance which the colonies had made during the eighteenth century, he said:
"Permit me, sir, to add another circumstance in our colonies,
which contributes no mean part towards the growth and effect of
thig untractable spirit-I mean their education. In no country
perhaps in the world is the law so general a study. The profession
itself is numerous and powerful: and in most provinces it takes the
lead. The greater number of the deputies sent to Congress were
lawyers. But all who read, and most do read, endeavor to obtain
some smattering in that science * * * This study renders men
acute, inquisitive, dexterous, prompt in attack, ready in defense,
full of resources. In other countries the people, more simple and
of a less mercurial cast, judge of an ill principle in government only
,by an actual grievance. Here they anticipate the evil, and judge of
the pressure of the grievance by the badness of the principle. They
augur misgovernment at a distance: and sniff the approach of tyranny in every tainted breeze."
It is today the destiny of the American people to fight for liberty
and democracy not on a national, but on a world-wide scale. American
lawyers will serve in many ways as this great enterprise unfolds, but none
of the services they render will prove more important in the end than
their historic function of maintaining the best in our tradition and translating the desire for freedom into positive programs consistent with
national ideals.
In Wisconsin, the legislature passed, over the governor's veto, a bill
integrating the bar. Wisconsin, therefore, becomes the twenty-fourth
state to have the integrated bar.
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Bar Integation
''The integrated bar has existed for eleven years in South Dakota.
It has proved to be an institution of great value both to the legal profession and to the public. It has brought together all of the practicing
lawyers of the state into one organization. Every lawyer, knowing that
he is and must be a member of the State Bar, has been forced to accept
responsibility for the betterment of his profession. The State Bar has
attempted to encourage study on the part of its members relative to the
intricate subjects which are embraced in the work of the profession. The
individual lawyer has become not only a thinker but a worker in the
cause.

'The bar standards for admission have been raised constantly
and
thus a better type of service has been assured the public. The integrated
bar has created an increased respect for high ethical standards in the
entire profession. Lawyers are judged and rated by the public and their
brother lawyers more for ethical standards than for ability. An organization of lawyers which does not require ethical standards of its members, and which does not speedily and adequately punish transgressors,
regardless of their importance, has but little reason for existence. A lax
organization simply impresses on the mind of the layman and the public
the erroneous impression that lawyers generally condone the acts of the
offending member of the profession." Excerpt from A Study of Bar
Organizationsin South Dakota, by Allen G. Wilson.
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Steps Taken to Perfect Legal
Assistance Plan
The Lawyers War Emergency Committee of the Colorado Bar
Association, under the chairmanship of Benjamin E. Sweet of Denver,
in conjunction with the legal assistance officers of the various posts and
commands within the Seventh Area Command, met at the Brown Palace
Hotel in Denver to effectuate the purposes of the circular of the War
Department establishing legal assistance offices.
Present at the conference, in addition to Benjamin E. Sweet, were
Edward L. Wood, president of the Colorado Bar Association:
Thomas Keeley, president-elect of the Denver Bar Association; Paul
Irey, general counsel of the Legal Aid Society of the Denver Bar
Association; Win. Hedges Robinson, Jr., secretary of the Colorado
Bar Association: Paul Fries, treasurer of the El Paso County Bar Association; Col. Frank E. Shaw; Lt. John Aboud; Maj. Richard Richmann; Capt. Arthur C. Murdock; Col. Neal D. Franklin; Maj. Henry
Burr, Jr.; Major Howard E. Reed: Lt. Col. Philip W. Whiteley; Capt.
Jessie N. Brans: Capt. Ralph H. Schaller; Capt. H. C. Kerr; Lt. Julian
B. Fite; Capt. Homer G. Preston; Lt. George J. Lauranchok: and Lt.
Jacob Agger.
After a discussicn of the problems arising incident to the establishing of legal assistance officer in each of the army posts and camps within
-the area, the group approved in principle the idea of sending out to each
prospective inductee at the time of his physical examination a guide which
would enable him to assimilate information concerning his property
holdings, insurance and obligations in order that the disposition and care
of his property would be simplified in the event of his induction into the
army.
A resolution was also passed by the group authorizing Mr. Sweet
to contact the American Bar Association, the War Department and the
National Selective Service Headquarters, with a view toward placing
such procedure on a national basis.
Following the meeting a tentative draft of the guide was drawn
and, after suggestions received from numerous competent sources, was
reduced to its final form. The guide. which is being printed gratuitously
by the Bradford-Robinson Printing Company as a part of its contribution to the war effort, is as follows:
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Property Guide
For Men About to Enter The
Armed Services of the United States

FOREWORD:
This Guide has been prepared by the Colorado Bar
Association in cooperation with the War Department to assist you in
arranging your personal affairs before you enter the service. Read it
carefully and follow these instructions.

Fill In Two Copies of the Following-Leave One Copy With Your
Wife, Father or Mother, Attorney or Trusted FriendTake the Other Copy With You.

RECORD
Full Name .....
Permanent Address
Date and Place of Birth ....
Civilian Occupation

Social Security No. ...........

Family:
Wife Children
Father an d M oth er ....................................
Name of attorney or trusted friend to be consulted in regard to
business or personal affairs AddressPROPERTY
I own the following property: (If none, so state.)
1. R ea l E sta t e -------------------------------------.
. .... ........ ...
Town

Street No.

Subject to mortgage of $
Bank account in theSafe deposit box in the
A utom obile ...... ...........
Make

Subject to mortgage of $
(NOTE:

-,

County

State

held by
Bank, at
-Bank, at
--------- -------

Year
,

Model

I icense No.

held by

If you contemplate selling or otherwise disposing of
your car during service, execute a Power of Attorney.)
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5.

Insurance"
Life Insurance:
Policy No.

Name of Co.

6.

Beneficiary

Amount

Where premiums
are payable

Beneficiary -------------National Service Life Ins. Amount ------------.
U.S. Government Life Ins. Amount -----------Beneficiary -- ---.----_---Stocks and Bonds:
Name.of.C......No...........of........Shares.................or............ond.............Face.............Value..........
Face Value
No. of Shares or Bonds
Name of Co.
War Bonds

7.

Co-owner

Beneficiary

Money which is due me:
Name of
Debtor

8.

No. of Bond

Face Amt.

Address

Nature
of Debt

How Evidenced
(Note, etc.)

Amount

When
Due

How Evidenced
(Note, etc.)

Amount

When
Due

Debts which I owe to others:
Address

Name of
Creditor

Nature
of Debt

MEMORANDUM
This Guide Is Not a Power of Attorney and It Is Not a Will-See
"Further Suggesions."
not ) executed a Power of Attorney naming
as my Attorney in fact.
I have (have not) executed a W ill nam ing ................................
as my Executor.
Instructions as to holding or disposing of property during my
service in the armed forces.
(Fill in any specific directions. In order to provide for sale or
disposition of property you should execute a Power of Attorney. This
is not a Power of Attorney.)
I have

w it h

(have

One copy of this Guide I am putting in an envelope and leaving
-..
........
.......................
......................................
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The following papers will also be in the envelope (indicate
which).
(Valuable papers such as stocks, bands, etc. should be kept
in a safe deposit box.)
1. Power of Attorney (or copy).
2. My Will (or copy).
3. Insurance policies.
4. Abstracts and title papers to real estate.
5. Automobile title papers.
6. Tax statements (Income, Social Security, Property).
7. Miscellaneous statements.
8. Naturalization papers.
9. Safe deposit box and other keys.
The other copy of this Guide I am taking with me together with
the following:
1. Certified or photostatic copy of marriage certificate.
2. Certified or photostatic copy of children's birth certificates.
IMPORTANT:
These copies may be needed to obtain family
allowance benefits.
The information in this Guide is confidential. It is to be used only
by the person to whom I am delivering a copy of this Guide.
Date ---(Signature)

The undersigned
going Guide.

acknowledges

receipt of a copy of the fore-

(Signature)

(Address)

Service Record:
Army Serial Number .....
Entered service at
on
A ssig n ed to .
--------------------------------------------------on
Further assignments:
- ------ ---.-.-------------- -----

.- .

--.- .- ..- ------------- ---- -------

-.--.-- -.--

.

to
t o

-

-----------

-

- - --- --

FURTHER SUGGESTIONS
1. The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act protects many of
your rights while you are in the service. If you are in doubt concerning
any existing contracts, leases, mortgages, taxes, judgments, insurance
policies, etc., consult your lawyer before entering service.
2. If you cannot secure an attorney, call MA 1035 (Legal Aid
Society). If outside Denver, consult any lawyer who 'will help you
or direct you where to go.
3. By executing a Power of Attorney you may name someone to
act as your representative to do for you and in your name anything you
might do if you were personally present.
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4. By cxecuting a Will you may name the person who is to
take charge of and administer your Estate (otherwise the Court will
appoint someone). You may name the persons who are to benefit and
how (otherwise it goes to your legal heirs as the law directs).
5. If you have any minor children, it is very important that you
make a Will (otherwise any interests which they receive as heirs might
be tied up in Court for years at considerable expense). To be valid a
Will must be drawn and executed in exact conformity to the law. Do
not attempt to draw or execute a Will without the advice of a lawyer.
6. The Soldiers' and Sailors' Act provides that the Government
will pay your insurance premiums in certain cases. You may obtain
Government insurance up to $10,000.00 at the Reception Center.
7. The Post or Camp to which you will be sent will have a Legal
Assistance Office where you can obtain legal assistance in matters connected with your affairs. Take one copy of this Guide with you to
deliver to the Legal Assistance Officer if needed.
8. Your Dependents-The Government has provided for family
allowances for your dependents. Wives, children, stepchildren and
divorced wives to whom alimony is decreed are known as Class A
dependents.
If your father, mother, grandfather, grandmother, stepfather,
stepmother, parents through adoption, brothers, sisters (of the half
blood as well as the whole blood, and stepbrothers or sisters) or
grandchildren are dependent upon you for support, they are known
as Class B dependents.
9.

Do These Things Now-Before You Enter the Service:

1. Fill out two copies of this Guide.
other copy with you.
2.
3.

Leave one copy.

Take the

Prepare a Power of Attorney if you have any property or business
which may need attention.
Execute a Will if you have or expect any substantial property.

This Guide has been prepared by the Colorado Bar Association.
It is of the utmost importance that you follow the instructions contained
herein, in order to assure protection of your dependents and your
estate during your service in the Armed Forces.
BENJAMIN E. SWEET,
Chairman, Lawyers War Emergency
Committee,
The Colorado Bar Association.

THOMAS N. GIMPERLING,
Colonel, Infantry,
Colorado Recruiting and
Induction Officer.
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Committee Issues Preliminary Draft of New
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
A preliminary draft of rules regulating criminal procedure in the
federal courts was released on May 24, 1943, by the Advisory Committee appointed by the Supreme Court of the United States. It is to be circulated for criticisms and suggestions among the federal courts, committees of lawyers appointed for that purpose by every federal district court,
bar associations, individual lawyers and other persons interested in the
subject. After the draft has been studied by the various courts, bar committees, judicial conferences and interested parties generally, it will be
revised in the light of criticisms and suggestions thus received and submitted to the Supreme Court of the United States in final form for its
action.
This work was undertaken pursuant to the authority of an act of
Congress of June 29, 1940, which authorized the Supreme Court of the
United States to adopt and promulgate rules of criminal procedure for
the federal courts. The purpose of this epoch-making action of the Congress was to empower the Supreme Court to provide a simple and uniform procedure for criminal cases for the federal courts throughout the
country. The present criminal procedure in the federal courts has developed gradually and in many features varies from one district to another.
Some matters are regulated by specific isolated acts of Congress passed at
different times, while in respect to other matters not so dealt with, the
federal courts are required to follow the procedure prevailing in the state
courts of the state in which the federal court is sitting.
After passage of the 1940 act, the Supreme Court appointed an
Advisory Committee to prepare a draft of rules for its consideration.
This committee is composed of lawyers from various parts of the country representing various points of view. Among the members are outstanding leaders of the bar, former federal and state judges, former federal
and state prosecutors, prominent defense counsel, and professors of law
from several leading law schools of the country.
The membership of the committee is as follows: Arthur T. Vanderbilt of Newark, New Jersey, former president of the American Bar
Association and of the American Judicature Society, chairman; James
J. Robinson of Bloomington, Indiana, chairman of the Criminal Law
Section fo the American Bar Association and director of the Institute of
Criminal Law Administration, Indiana University, Reporter: Alexander
Holtzoff of Washington, D. C., Special Assistant to the Attorney General of the United States, secretary; George James Burke of Ann Arbor,
Michigan, member of the Michigan bar and now General Counsel of the
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Office of Price Administration; John J. Burns of Boston, Massachusetts,
former judge of the superior court of Massachusetts and former General
Counsel of the Securities and Exchange Commission, now engaged in
private practice; Frederick E. Crane of New York City, former Chief
Judge of the Court of Appeals of New York state; Gordon Dean of
Washington, D. C., member of the bar of Washington, D. C., engaged
in private practice; George H. Dession of New Haven, Connecticut,
professor at Yale University School of Law; Sheldon Glueck of Cambridge, Massachusetts, professor at the Harvard Law School; George F.
Longsdorf of Oakland, California, well-known writer of legal treatises,
including one on federal procedure: George Z. Medalie of New York
City, former United States Attorney for the southern district of New
York, now in private practice; Hugh D. McLellan of Boston, Massachusetts, former United States district court judge for the district of Massachusetts, now engaged in private practice: Lester B. Orfield of Lincoln,
Nebraska, professor at the University of Nebraska Law School; Murray
Seasongood of Cincinnati, Ohio, member of the Ohio bar and former
mayor of Cincinnati; J. 0. Seth of Santa Fe, New Mexico, member of
the New Mexico bar, engaged in private practice; John B. Waite of Ann
Arbor, Michigan, professor at the University of Michigan Law School;
Herbert Wechsler of Washington, D. C., professor at Columbia Law
School, now connected with the Department of Justice, and G. Aaron
Youngquist of Minneapolis, Minnesota, former Assistant Attorney General of the United States and now engaged in private practice.
A similar revision of civil procedure in the federal courts was made
by the Supreme Court several years ago, pursuant to an act of Congress
which became law on June 19, 1934. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure became effective on September 16. 1938, and are generally regarded as an outstanding landmark in judicial reform.
The proposed Rules of Criminal Procedure outline the entire procedure in a criminal case from arrest until final disposition of the case,
including appeal. They would prescribe a uniform and simplified practice for all federal courts. Among the outstanding feautres is the elimination of preliminary technical proceedings known among lawyers
pleas in abatement, demurrers, and motions to quash. In their pla
ne
rules substitute a simple omnibus motion by which the defenda'-, would
be required to raise all preliminary objections at one time, if he has any.
The rules substitute a simple form of indictment for the long prolix
technical form of indictment which has come down through the centuries and which is still used by federal prosecutors. The rules would
simplify the present technicalities which surround the proceeding to
remove a defendant from one district to another, if he has been arrested
in a district other than that in which he had been indicted. The rules
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would introduce into the criminal courts opportunities for the use of
pretrial procedure, which has been effectively used in civil cases, for the
purpose of narrowing issues and stipulating facts. The rules would also
eliminate some of the technical forms involved in criminal appeals.
On the other hand, the rules are careful to surround a defendant
with necessary protection. They contain a provision for a prompt hearing after arrest; for making effective the right of counsel, and for according to him other rights which are traditionally accorded to defendants in
criminal cases.

Colorado Bar Water Bill Becomes Law
Governor Vivian has signed Senate Bill 90, being the Water Procedural Code prepared by the Water Section of the Colorado Bar Association. No amendments were made either in the Senate or in the House,
and the bill received the unanimous vote of both branches of the Legislature. This completes the first step in the codification of the w-ater laws
of Colorado.
The new code consists of twenty-five typewritten pages and contains twenty-four sections, as against forty-eight sections of the present
statutes. Any proceeding now pending in court may be completed, at the
election of the court, either under the new code or under the present
statutes. The new code will, of course, be printed in the near future as
part of the 1943 Session Laws.
The Colorado Bar Association, if desired, can now continue its
work by considering the following:
(a) Those procedural provisions which were omitted from the
Water Procedural Code because controversial;
(b) The administrative provisions which ought to be included in
a Water Administration Code, and which are already under consideration by some of the water engineers of the state;
(c) Those provisions concerning irrigation districts which could
form a Water Organization Code;
(d)
The various provisions which might be combined into a
Miscellaneous Water Code.
The controversial procedural questions, omitted from Senate Bill
90, include (1) conditional decrees, (2) double and multiple filling of
reservoirs, (3) burden of proof in transfer cases, and (4) abandonment
in case of five years non-use.
MALCOLM LINDSEY,

Chairman, Water Council.
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